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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS:
GRAPPLING WITH IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY IN
THE NEW NEPALI CONSTITUTION
David Pimentel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nepal is struggling to produce a new constitution, the blueprint for a
new post-monarchic state. The political and ideological history of Nepal,
including a checkered history with constitutionalism, complicates the
picture, particularly as it applies to the structure of the new Nepali judiciary.
The rhetoric of the various parties seems similar in terms of what each
envisions in the new constitution, but the conflicts beneath the rhetoric
loom large. While there appears to be consensus among diverse political
interests in Nepal that the new state will be secular and have some type of
federal structure, the substantive agreement ends there.'
The rhetorical similarities are deceiving, as ideology can vest the
same words with different, even contradictory meanings. For example,
during the Cold War, "democratic" had a profoundly different meaning in
West Germany than it did in East Germany, which called itself the "German
Democratic Republic" notwithstanding its socialist/communist ideology.2
Similarly, the rhetoric in the debate over the new judiciary in Nepal
consistently calls for a judiciary that is "independent and accountable." But
there is no consensus on what these terms mean, or should mean, in Nepal
today.
These concepts of independence and accountability conflict with each
other to some degree, but there is no one-size-fits-all approach to balancing
* Fulbright Scholar, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010-11);
Associate Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law. Thanks to the American Bar
Association Rule of Law Initiative, especially Dave Sadoff and Gopi Parajuli, for facilitating
the July 2010 visit to Nepal and the meetings with key participants in the constitution-
drafting process. Much of the content of this article, and the perspective reflected in it, came
directly from the consultations I was able to engage in with a variety of important players,
from all parts of the political spectrum, during that visit to Kathmandu. Thanks to the Open
Society Institute for funding. The views expressed in this article are, however, entirely those
of the author.
1. Damakant Jayshi, Parties at Odds, Peace at Risk, INTER-PRESS SERVICE
(Jan. 5, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49886 ("[T]he parties disagree on all
major issues to be incorporated in the Constitution-preamble, fundamental rights, federal
model, the number and nature of federal states and distribution of natural resources.").
2. Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Germany, U.S. DEP'T
STATE (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eilbgn/3997.htm ("The G.D.R. established
the structures of a single-party, centralized, communist state.").
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them. Despite talk about international best practices, the appropriate
balance between these competing priorities cannot be imported from
elsewhere. It must be determined with respect to Nepali culture, history,
and politics. Both historical and ideological factors in present day Nepal tip
the scales in favor of accountability at the expense of judicial independence.
The challenge will be to find or create a judicial governance model that can
heighten accountability while minimizing political or other interference
with independent decision-making.
Similarly, competing definitions of "separation of powers" point in
opposite directions on the issue of judicial review. However, by reaching
beyond the deceptive rhetorical similarities and understanding the history
and ideologies that inform the debate, it becomes clear that a new
constitutional court, separate from the Supreme Court of Nepal, is the best
path forward. A new institution, a departure from the status quo, is
important for the reinvention of Nepali government.
If the parties can move beyond the rhetoric and appreciate each
others' differing ideological stances, as well as the checkered history of
Nepal's courts, there is room for consensus. Such a compromise, one that
creates new institutions and enhances judicial accountability without
infringing too much on judicial independence, is essential to reach an
agreement on the new constitution and to establish a fair and effective
Nepali judiciary.
II. BACKGROUND
A. EXPERIENCE WITH THE 1990 CONSTITUTION
Everything happening in Nepali politics today is, at some level, a
reaction to Nepal's experience with the 1990 constitution (The Constitution
of the Kingdom of Nepal) and the regime that existed under it.4  This
includes the drafting of the judiciary provisions of the new constitution.'
Although Nepal flirted with constitutionalism for forty years, the first
3. Sagar Prasai, Nepal's Constituent Assembly Gets New Lease, but Politics Go Back
to Square One, IN AsIA (June 2, 2010), http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2010/06/02/nepals-
constituent-assembly-gets-new-lease-but-politics-go-back-to-square-one/.
4. See generally United Nations Development Programme, The Interim Constitution of
Nepal, 2063 (2007) as Amended by the First, Second and Third Amendments (2008),
available at http://ccrinepal.org/files/downloads/37ddc770102c2dcf8b25892721729b5e.zip
("Among the shortcomings of the [1990] Constitution in the eyes of many were the
insistence that Nepal is a Hindu kingdom; the inclusion of many important economic and
social rights as 'directive principles' only, which means they were not able to be used as the
basis for legal claims; inadequate provisions for civilian control of the army; excessive
power given to the King; and provisions that were not clear enough about the King's powers,
thus making it possible for those powers to be abused.").
5. Id.
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true and meaningful constitution in Nepal came in 1990,6 establishing a
constitutional monarchy, formally recognizing royal powers, and declaring
Nepal a Hindu state. Dissatisfaction with the 1990 constitution fostered
the Maoist insurgency,8 which mobilized those disenfranchised by the
Hindu caste system, among others, to resist the constitutional regime.9 The
Maoistso became the primary critics of the regime and the champions of
anyone aggrieved by it.'
Among the Maoists' complaints were problems with the Nepali
judiciary.12 The 1990 constitution reflected, in large part, the prevailing
international best practice of an independent judiciary governed by a
judicial council.' 3 In theory, this is still the best constitutional structure for
the Nepali judiciary.14 In practice, however, the Nepali judiciary under the
1990 constitution was dysfunctional and corrupt, or at least widely
perceived to be.' 5 Against this historical backdrop, the advantages of an
independent judiciary and an autonomous judicial council to govern it are
more difficult to defend.
6. See generally David Pimentel, Constitutional Concepts for the Rule of Law: A
Vision for the Post-Monarchy Judiciary in Nepal, 9 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 283,
285-89 (2010) [hereinafter Constitutional Concepts].
7. Enayetur Rahim, Nepal: Government and Politic, The Constitution of 1990, in
NEPAL & BHUTAN: COUNTRY STUDIES (Andrea Matles Savada, ed., 3d ed. 1993), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+np1O 1).
8. Alastair Lawson, Who are Nepal's Maoist Rebels?, BBC NEWS, June 6, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3573402.stm ("The disillusionment of the Maoists with the
Nepalese political system began after democracy was re-introduced in 1990.").
9. Id. ("[The Maoist rebels] have stayed consistent ... in their demand for an end to
Nepal's constitutional monarchy. Another key grievance of the rebels was the resentment
felt by lower caste people against the authority wielded by the higher castes.").
10. The term "Maoists" is used throughout the article and denotes specifically the
Maoist group that is active within Nepali politics.
11. Lawson, supra note 8 ("[A] substantial number of people in Nepal ... see the
Maoists as the only genuine alternative to the old, repressive social order.")
12. See, e.g., Maoists Wrath Against Nepal Judiciary, TELEGRAPH NEPAL,
Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.telegraphnepal.com/headline/2009-03-26/maoists-wrath-against-
nepal-judiciary.
13. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL, 1990, para. 93, § 1.
14. Constitutional Concepts, supra note 6.
15. Nepal Country Profile: Judicial System, Bus. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL,
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/south-asia/nepal/corruption-
levels/ judicial-system/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (citing the Bertelsmann Transformation
Index 2010 Nepal Country Report, BERTLERSMANN FOUND. (2009) http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/1 17.0.html?&L=l). "The judiciary is perceived to be among the
most corrupt institutions in Nepal. According to Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, court
officials are perceived as the main facilitators of corruption." Id.
2011] 209
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B. POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CLIMATE
The political revolution in Nepal that gave rise to the new
constitution-making process is a direct product of the Maoist insurgency
and the 2006 settlement of its demands that brought an end to the
monarchy.' 6 Accordingly, the Maoists claim a right to sit at the table and
dictate many of the terms of the government that will be established by the
new constitution. If the elections had given them a clear majority, the
Maoists would be able to do precisely that. However, the Maoists do not
enjoy an outright majority in the present legislature, known as the
Constituent Assembly (CA). Therefore, they do not have the power to
control the constitution-making process.' 7  In fact, as of May 2009, the
Maoists are no longer part of the coalition government.' 8 But because the
Maoists have, by far, the largest bloc of any party in the CA, they remain a
powerful political force.' 9 The upshot is that they must reach compromises
with the other political parties for the constitution-making process to move
forward.
Compromises will be difficult, however, given the ideological
differences and mindset of the Maoists. Because the Maoists literally
fought for change in Nepal, anything that smacks of the status quo is
entirely unacceptable to them, 20 including constitutional provisions for a
judicial structure. While much of the drafting process appears to be mired in
disagreements and political discord, the Maoists have already drafted a
proposed constitution, presumably for discussion purposes.2' While it is not
a polished document, it unambiguously sets forth the Maoists' policies and
priorities for the new constitution.22
16. See Timeline: Nepal, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilsouth asia/country
profiles/i 166516.stm (last updated Feb. 17, 2011, 15:42 GMT).
17. Prassi, supra note 3.
18. Id. ("The Maoists are the largest party in the Constituent Assembly, but a 22-party
coalition has managed to push them to the fringes of national politics.").
19. Bureau of S. & Cent. Asian Affairs, Background Note: Nepal, U.S. DEP'T STATE
(Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eilbgn/5283.htm. In the 2008 elections, the
Maoists secured 229 of the 601 seats, which was almost exactly twice as many as the next
largest bloc (Nepali Congress Party with 115 seats) but far short of the majority they would
need to control the Constituent Assembly outright. Id.
20. Interview by Ben Peterson with Manushi Bhattarai, Maoist Student Leader,
(June 13, 2009), available at http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=4213 (characterizing the
other parties in Nepal as "status quo-ist" and highlighting the challenge to fight the "status
quo" forces).
21. S. Chandrasekharan, NEPAL: Draft Constitution of Maoists Unveiled, S. AsIA
ANALYSIS GROUP (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org//notes6/note5O2.html.
22. Id. ("While this document may not be the ultimate draft of the constitution, it reveals
the mind and the intention of the Maoists of the type of configuration they are looking for in
the new constitution.").
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C. STATUS OF THE CONSTHUTIONDRAFTING PROCESS
The status of the constitutional drafting process changes daily. The
CA, shortly after its creation under the Interim Constitution in 2008, set
May 28, 2010, as the deadline to complete the new constitution.2 3 Delays,
largely due to the political difficulties detailed above, made it impossible to
meet that deadline.24 The CA voted in the closing minutes of its existence
to extend its own life for another year, establishing a May 2011 deadline to
produce a new constitution. 2  While some have questioned the authority of
the CA to take such actions,26 the practical necessity of these actions has
calmed dissenting voices. If the government under the Interim Constitution
had been allowed to expire, it would have left a vacuum of leadership and
legal authority, a vacuum few wanted.27
Accordingly, there is a new deadline and hope for Nepal's
constitutional future, although the process has been strained. Under the
chairmanship of Nilambar Acharya, the Constitutional Committee (CC)25
established a roadmap and timetable for the drafting process. In addition to
the CC, which oversees the entire process, ten thematic committees were
appointed from the membership of the CA. Each committee had
responsibility for certain subject matter in the new constitution and was
charged with creating a concept paper detailing provisions on that topic that
should be included in the constitution. Most of these committees attempted
to arrive at some kind of consensus, with limited success and consequent
23. C. Balaji, Nepal 28 May 2010 Due Date for Nepal Constitution to be Finalized,
WORLD NEWS FORECAST (May 28, 2010), http://www.newsahead.com/preview/
2010/05/28/nepal-28-may-2010-due-date-for-nepal-constitution-to-be-finalized/index.php.
24. Id. ("Reuters reports that the political deadlock has delayed the preparation of a new
constitution.").
25. By the time this article went to print, the new deadline of May 28, 2011, for the
production of a new constitution had also been missed. On May 29, 2011, the political
parties averted a crisis (see infra, note 27), reaching an agreement to extend the deadline
another three months. Whether that deadline can or will be met is anyone's guess. Kiran
Chapagain, Nepal Averts Crisis Over Constitution Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/world/asia/30nepal.html.
26. United Nations Development Programme, supra note 4, at 116. Indeed, it seems
obvious that the CA had no such authority, as the Interim Constitution specifies a term of
two years for the CA. Id. But the Interim Constitution doesn't allow for new elections
either. Id.
27. Balaji, supra note 23. "There are fears that Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal
will declare a state of emergency if the Constituent Assembly fails to deliver [a constitution]
by the due date. An unmet deadline for a constitution acceptable to all parties could trigger
another civil war, while increasing India's and China's tug-of-war for the Himalayan
Kingdom." Id.
28. NC Leader Elected Head of Nepal Constitution-Drafting Body, ZEE NEWS,
http://www.zeenews.com/news559032.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2009 4:24 PM).
2011] 211
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delay.29  In contrast, the forty-three member Committee on the Judicial
System took an up-or-down vote on each proposed revision 0 and was
therefore able to complete its Report Preliminary Draft with the Concept
Paper (CJS Concept Paper) promptly, by the fall of 2009.31 The problem
with the Committee on the Judicial System's approach was that the end
product did not reflect consensus and engendered a great deal of opposition
even within the committee. Seven dissenting opinions are appended to the
CJS Concept Paper, six of them signed by a bloc of nineteen committee
members detailing their objections to the paper's recommendations.32
Committee reports and concept papers are not the definitive word on
each subject. They must go through the CC, which draws from them but is
not bound by them in drafting the constitution. Indeed, the CC will have to
make changes, as some elements of the concept papers are in direct conflict.
For example, the Report and Concept Paper of the Committee on State
Restructuring specifically calls for the creation of a "Constitutional Court"
to resolve questions of constitutional interpretation. It even specifies the
composition of that court.34 On the other hand, the CJS Concept Paper did
not provide for the creation or existence of such a court.3 ' Accordingly, the
Reports need to be harmonized, and until then, the underlying issues remain
open for negotiation and resolution through ongoing dialogue. These issues
are considered by the powerful "Gaps and Overlaps Committee," which is
already appointed for the purpose of reconciling inconsistencies, before
going to the CC for final resolution.36  Whether there will be a
29. Whither Constitution Writing?, NEPALI TIMES, May 28, 2010,
http://www.nepalitimes.com.np/issue/2010/05/28/ConstitutionSupplement/17125. As of
May 28, 2010, which was the original deadline for completion of the constitution, "only
three committees' draft papers ha[d] been passed unanimously." Id.
30. Interview with Kumar Regmi, Constitutional Lawyer, in Kathmandu, Nepal
(July 18, 2010), (notes on file with the author). The Maoists' proposals prevailed in the
Committee on the Justice System, for the most part, because the Madhesi party
representatives chose to vote with the Maoists on most issues. Id; see COMM. ON JUDICIAL
SYS. TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, A REPORT PRELIMINARY DRAFT WITH THE CONCEPT
PAPER (2009), available at http://www.ccd.org.np/new/resources/conceptjaperJudiciary
System ENG.pdf [hereinafter CJS CONCEPT PAPER].
31. Id.
32. Id. at 68-84. Eighteen committee members signed the seventh dissenting opinion.
Id. at 68.
33. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, RESTRUCTURING OF THE STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF
STATE POWER COMMITTEE, REPORT ON CONCEPT PAPER AND PRELIMINARY DRAFT art. 11,
§ 11 (2010), available at http://www.ccd.org.np/new/resources/ConceptPaper Re
structuring StateGTZENG.pdf.
34. Id. at 38.
35. CJS CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 30.
36. See Constitution Building e-Bulletin: What's Happening at the Constituent Assembly
(CA), CENTER FOR CONST. DIALOGUE, at para. 6 (May 1, 2010), http://ccd.org.np
/new/index.php?newsletter detail id=16 (referencing the role of the Gaps and Overlaps
212 [Vol. 21:2
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Constitutional Court, separate from the Supreme Court, and what
jurisdiction it may have, remain open questions.
III. COMPETING CONCEPTS FOR THE NEPALI JUDICIARY
A. IDEOLOGY AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
The vision of the Maoists, who represent the political left in Nepal,
differs significantly from the Marxist-Socialist views of Chairman Mao
Zedong or of the Soviet-era Warsaw Pact nations. The International Crisis
Group described them as follows:
Despite having an authoritarian outlook, the Maoists
maintained a culture of debate within their party; key issues
have been widely discussed and hotly contested. From the
end of the 1990s, they have moved gradually toward a
more moderate stance. They changed positions in
acknowledging the 1990 democracy movement as a success
(they had earlier characterised it as a "betrayal"), in
abandoning the immediate goal of a Mao-style "new
democracy" and, in November 2005, by aligning
themselves with the mainstream parties in favour of
multiparty democracy.
While the Maoists do not advocate for a traditional communist regime, their
perspective and rhetoric are inevitably infused with Marxist ideology,
which, in turn, informs their perception of the role of the judiciary. On
Nepal's political right is the Nepali Congress Party, which controlled the
government during most of the period that the country was operating under
the 1990 constitution. The Unified Marxist-Leninists, popularly viewed as
moderates, have been in the middle as the third largest party, but there are
as many as twenty other parties operating in Nepal.
In common law regimes, the judiciary historically has protected the
people from the abuses of government. 40 This Western perspective defines
Committee).
37. INT'L CRISIs GRP., NEPAL'S MAOISTS: PURISTS OR PRAGMATISTS?: ASIA REPORT No.
132, at i (2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/
132_nepal_s-maoists__purists-orjragmatists.ashx.
38. See Kiran Chapagain & Jim Yardley, Nepal's Parliament Fails in 5th Try to Select
Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20l0/08/24/world/
asia/24nepal.html.
39. See Prasai, supra note 3 (referencing a twenty-two party coalition in the CA,
excluding the Maoists).
40. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 17 (3d ed. 2007)
("in the United States and England ... there was a ... judicial tradition ... in which judges
2011] 213
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justice on the micro level. Any attempt to subvert individual justice in
pursuit of higher societal goals is roundly condemned as evil.
From the Marxist point of view, however, it is not the courts that
protect the people (individually) from government, but rather the
government that protects the people (collectively) from exploitation by
capitalists. 4 1 Government is not a threat to justice or to the rights of the
people; government is the source of social justice and the protector of the
people.42 From this perspective, there is no reason to expect the judicial
branch to be independent from the political branches of government.
Rather, the judicial branch is perceived as another arm of the government,
similarly committed to carrying out the government's agenda.43
Indeed, the Soviet Union and other communist-bloc nations shared
this concept of the judicial branch. Dallin Oaks, former justice of the Utah
Supreme Court, recently recounted his experience with Soviet-style justice:
I have thought of how our system contrasts with that of the
now defunct Soviet Union. During my years as president
of BYU [Brigham Young University] (1971-80), I hosted
the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union,
who was touring the United States in that Cold War period.
In a private one-on-one discussion, I asked him how the
Soviet system really worked in a highly visible criminal
case, such as where a person was charged with an offense
like treason or other crimes against the state. He explained
that on those kinds of cases they had what they called
had often been a progressive force on the side of the individual against the abuse of power
by the ruler.").
41. See generally KARL MARX & FREDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
(1848).
42. NIKOLAI BUKHARIN & YEVGENI PREOBRAZHENSKY, THE ABC OF COMMUNISM § 23
(1920) ("For the realization of the communist system the proletariat must have all authority
and all power in its hands. The proletariat cannot overthrow the old world unless it has
power in its hands, unless for a time it becomes the ruling class. Manifestly the bourgeoisie
will not abandon its position without a fight. For the bourgeoisie, communism signifies the
loss of its former power, the loss of its 'freedom' to extort blood and sweat from the workers;
the loss of its right to rent, interest, and profit. Consequently the communist revolution of
the proletariat, the communist transformation of society, is fiercely resisted by the exploiters.
It follows that the principal task of the workers' government is to crush this opposition
ruthlessly.").
43. Id. at § 71 ("In fine, in the long succession of civil and criminal affairs, the
proceedings of the courts must be conducted in the spirit of the new socialist society which is
in course of construction. For these reasons the Soviet Power did not merely destroy all the
old machinery of justice which, while serving capital, hypocritically proclaimed itself to be
the voice of the people. It went farther, and constituted new courts, making no attempt to
conceal their class character. In the old law-courts, the class minority of exploiters passed
judgement upon the working majority. The law-courts of the proletarian dictatorship are
places where the working majority passes judgement upon the exploiting minority.").
214 [Vol. 21:2
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"telephone justice." Judges conducted the trial and heard
the evidence and then went back to their chambers and had
a phone call from a government or party official who told
them how to decide the case.
I am grateful that, whatever difficulties we have in our
system of justice-and there are many-we are still far
away from what he called "telephone justice." What stands
between us and that corruption of the judicial system .. . is
the independence of our state and federal judges."
Particularly shocking to Western sensibilities is the fact that the Soviet
Chief Justice explained the telephone justice system openly and without
apparent embarrassment. Most Westerners would unhesitatingly join in
Oaks' assessment of that practice as an indicator of a corrupt judicial
system.
But again, from the Marxist perspective, the government, or perhaps
more specifically the party, is the guardian of the people's rights and
interests; no one else should make the decision in sensitive cases.
According to this view, entrusting such decisions to individual judges may
result in decisions that are in conflict with the best interests of the people
overall. In the post-communist state, telephone justice is still talked
about.4 5 Although it is generally decried in post-communist retrospect, it
was accepted as a fact of life, perhaps even a necessary one, under
communist regimes." The Marxist will not allow the decision of an
individual judge to frustrate the government's pursuit of the best interests of
the people. By ideological contrast, the Western capitalist will not let the
government's political agenda frustrate justice in an individual case.
The differences may be characterized in terms of trust. Judicial
independence places enormous trust in judges, expecting them to do the
right thing and to do justice even when there are compelling political or
personal reasons to do otherwise. Western society's embrace of judicial
independence reflects a distrust of government, even of majoritarian
44. Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Constitution Day
Speech at the Salt Lake Tabernacle: Fundamentals of our Constitutions (Sept. 17, 2010),
available at http://newsroom.Ids.org/article/fundamentals-of-our-constitutions-elder-dallin-
h-oaks.
45. Alena Ledeneva, Behind the Fagade: "Telephone Justice" in Putin's Russia, in
DICTATORSHIP OR REFORM? THE RULE OF LAW IN RuSSIA 24-36 (2006), available at
http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/26627/ichaptersection-singledocument/036BC43
7-22 1A-4FC3-9EC3-E82BDECA7084/en/Chap_3_Ledeneva.pdf.
46. Id. (citing Peter Solomon, Jr., Soviet Politicians and Criminal Prosecutions: The
Logic ofIntervention, in CRACKS IN THE MONOLITH (James Millar ed., 1992)). "Communist
governance resulted in what Peter Solomon has called the 'logic of intervention' or the logic
of the 'directive from above' where the Communist party had the last word." Id.
2011] 215
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government. The belief is that such governments will exploit and victimize
unpopular minorities unless they are subject to the checks and balances that
come from an independent judiciary.
This idea is reflected in Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in
America, which recognizes the role of the judiciary in protecting the
minority from the "tyranny of the majority.A7  This statement is
foundational to the American ideological concept of the judiciary: because
of their independence from majoritarian politics, only judges can be
effective guardians of the rights of unpopular minorities.
In contrast, meetings with prominent Maoists involved in the
constitution drafting process revealed that they have much greater trust in
the government than in "independent" judges.48 In Nepal, unlike Soviet-era
socialist governments, this trust is not a blind faith in the Communist Party.
Whatever else may appear in the new Nepali constitution, it will certainly
provide for a parliamentary system where the government is a direct
product of popular elections. 4 9 The Maoists trust the legislature more than
the judiciary because the legislature is accountable to the people.
Independent judges, unaccountable to anyone, simply cannot command that
type of confidence;5 ' in the Maoists' view, a judiciary that is independent of
parliamentary control is inherently undemocratic and, therefore, not to be
trusted.
Summarizing, and perhaps oversimplifying, Western ideology trusts
judges to do the right thing as long as they are not pressured by political
forces to do otherwise. Maoist ideology in Nepal assumes judges will do
the wrong thing unless pressured by political forces otherwise. These
conflicting assumptions demand fundamentally different policy
prescriptions for Nepal's judicial structure and are not amenable to
compromise.
47. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. 15 (1835).
The term "tyranny of the majority" was further popularized by John Stuart Mill, who used it
in his essay "On Liberty" (1859). See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Bartleby 1999).
48. Interview with Ek Raj Bhandari, CA Member and Member of the Gaps and
Overlaps Committee, in Kathmandu, Nepal (July 14, 2010) (notes on file with author).
Mr. Bhandari gave a passionate explanation of the Maoist perspective on judicial
independence; he pitched it in terms of his confidence in the democratic process and
advocated entrusting the judiciary to the people and making it accountable to the people by
placing it squarely under the power and control of those most responsive to the people: the
elected legislature. See also Interview with Khim Lal Devkota, CA Member and Member of
the Committee on the Judicial System, in Kathmandu, Nepal (July 16, 2010) (notes on file
with author).
49. See Prasai, supra note 3 (noting that the Maoists have moderated their position and
support a multiparty government now).
50. Interview with Ek Raj Bhandari, supra note 48.
51. Interview with Khim Lal Devkota, supra note 48. (Mr. Devkota argued that the
judiciary must be accessible and transparent; citizens must feel like the judiciary belongs to
them and that they want to support it and strengthen it because it gives them justice.).
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B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE V. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Scholars have paid considerable attention to the tension between
judicial independence and judicial accountability, often attempting to strike
an appropriate balance between these two competing policies.5 2  This
tension exists because a fully independent judiciary is accountable to no one
and can render controversial or unpopular judgments without fear of
repercussions. On the other hand, an accountable judiciary is answerable
for its actions and, therefore, can never be truly independent. As has been
previously argued, 54 there is no one-size-fits-all balance to strike between
judicial independence and judicial accountability. Nepal presents a
compelling case.
Consider the two attributes Westerners prize most in the context of
judicial independence and accountability: judges who demonstrate
(1) integrity to recognize their ethical obligations and uphold them, and
(2) courage to withstand outside pressure in rendering their decisions. 55
Accountability, in the form of disciplinary mechanisms for miscreant
judges is important to encourage integrity; independence, in the form of
structural protections for judges, insulating them from repercussions for
their decisions, is important to bolster judicial courage. Aside from
structures to protect their independence or disciplinary regimes to hold
them accountable, every judge comes to the job with a personal endowment
of both courage and integrity, an endowment that can be represented as a
unique point on the figure below:
52. Symposium, Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: Searching for the
Right Balance, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 899 (2006). In 2006, the Case Western Reserve
Law Review conducted a symposium entitled "Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability: Searching for the Right Balance." Id. The title of the symposium alone
betrays the nearly axiomatic understanding that these two principles are in fundamental
conflict and that a balance must be struck between them.
53. David Pimentel, Refraining the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining
Judicial Structure in Light of Judges' Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 18
(2009) [hereinafter Refraining the Debate].
54. Id. at 31-32.
55. Id. at 20-23.
56. Id. at 29.
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Low Judicial Courage High
Fig. 1 -- Plotting Judicial Courage and Integrity on a Graph
[I]n the Northeast quadrant (Quadrant A), we find the
judges of the highest integrity and the highest courage.
These are our "heroes." In the Northwest quadrant
(Quadrant B), we find judges who want to do the right
thing, but are vulnerable to outside threats and pressures;
their integrity is high, but their courage is lacking.
Quadrant C, in the Southwest, includes the "corruptible"
judges, whose integrity is dubious, and who, lacking
courage, are susceptible to pressure. Here is where you
might find judges who pander to the whims of the
executive branch or [who might] even be in the pocket of
the mob. They are not bent on pursuing their own corrupt
agenda (see Quadrant D, infra) as they lack the courage for
such an enterprise, but are manipulable, and may well end
up doing the bidding of others. In the Southeast (Quadrant
D) we find the scariest of all, the judges with low integrity
and ample courage; these are what Judge Noonan described
as "Monsters" in his book on judicial ethics--judges who
boldly pursue their own corrupt objectives.
Using this model, one can see that strengthening structural protections
for judicial independence may do more harm than good if the judges are
57. Reframing the Debate, supra note 53, at 27-28 (citing THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE:
READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS 35-47 (JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & KENNETH I. WINSTON eds.,
1993)).
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located in the bottom half of the graph. A judge who lacks integrity will
only be emboldened in his corruption by a regime that immunizes him from
outside pressures. Structural protections for judicial independence are
helpful only if the judges have already demonstrated a reasonable degree of
integrity. The Western system that trusts judges assumes this threshold










Low Judicial Courage High
Fig. 2 -- Impact of strengthened structural protections for judges"
C. HISTORICAL BAGGAGE IN THE NEPALI JUDICIARY
History complements ideology as a critical and perhaps controlling
factor in the future of the Nepali judiciary. The 1990 constitution did afford
the judges a high degree of independence. That independence was
strengthened further by the fact that the disciplinary body, the judicial
council, rarely exercised its power to police the judiciary.59 The result was,
according to popular perception, a judiciary that earned the confidence of
no one and a bench that distinguished itself more by its corruption than by
anything else. 60 The Western model of trusting judges failed to work. The
general perception in Nepal is that the judges were unworthy of such trust.61
58. Id. at 29-30.
59. Interview with Khim Lal Devkota, supra note 48. Mr. Devkota cited the failures of
the Judicial Council, which, he said, despite obvious corruption throughout the system has
never removed a judge in twenty years. This author has not attempted to verify the claim,
but it is worth noting that this perception comes from a member of the CA and the
Committee on the Judicial System. See id.
60. See Nepal's Judiciary Is Most Corrupt: TI Report, NEPAL BIZ NEWS.COM
(May 25, 2007), http://www.nepalbiznews.com/newsdata/Biz-News/judicial.html (citing
Transparency INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
Unsurprisingly, the popular outcry in Nepal-and not just from the
Maoists-is for a judiciary that is accountable.62 Judicial independence
advocates cannot effectively argue that the Nepali people should trust their
judges and accord them the independence to do the right thing. Trusting the
judges too much and giving them too much independence is widely
perceived by Nepali citizens as one of the sources of the present problem.
IV. THE RHETORICAL GAP
No one in the current Nepali constitutional debate is openly
advocating against an independent judiciary. The rhetoric from all sides is
consistent that judicial independence is desirable. The CJS Concept Paper
contains thirteen separate references to judicial independence, mostly
justifying provisions on the grounds that judicial independence requires
them, including the following:
"The constitution has to provide functional independency to
judges."
"As the judicial independency is an essential condition for the fair
justice, the person who is dispensing justice should also be fair, competent,
capable, impartial.""
"The meaning of the independence of judiciary refers not only to be
free from intervention in the judicial process by any person, authority or
bodies other than judiciary, but also free from influence of any level or
office-bearer of and within the judiciary itself."65
"The judicial independency is an essential condition in order to carry
out judicial proceeding according to law."
Despite these concessions on the importance of judicial
independence, the CJS Concept Paper itself entrusts the governance of the
judiciary, including all appointments, oversight, discipline, and removal, to
a Special Committee of the Legislature (Special Legislative Committee).67
SYSTEMS (2007)) ("A country report on judicial corruption released ... by Transparency
International Nepal said Nepal's judiciary is one of the most corruption-affected sectors in
the country. The Global Corruption Report 2007 prepared by senior advocate Krishna
Prasad Bhandary on behalf of Transparency International (TI) said though corruption and
irregularities are rife in Nepal's judiciary, initiatives are not being taken to curb such
malpractices.").
61. See generally, Sewanta Kattel, Local Level Perception of Corruption: An
Anthropological Inquiry, 3 DHAULAGIRI J. Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY (2009) (analyzing the
sources of the public perception of public corruption, including judicial corruption).
62. Interview with Ek Raj Bhandari, supra note 48; interview with Khim Lal Devkota
supra note 48.
63. CJS CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 30, at 15.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 31.
66. Id. at 27.
67. Id. at 39.
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This Special Legislative Committee is conceived as an eleven-person body,
chaired by the Deputy Speaker of the Legislature and composed of the
Minister for Law and Justice and nine additional members of the
legislature. The rationale for the Special Legislative Committee is
articulated in the CJS Concept Paper in terms of "democratiz[ing]" the
courts:
The foundation of Democracy is the Civilian Supremacy.
As the legislature is a representative body and also
exercises the sovereignty of the people, the voice of people
should only be reflected via this body. One of the major
reasons behind the judiciary in the past that the people
never realized ownership over it was lack of judiciary's
responsibility to the people. Therefore, it is necessary to
democratize the judiciary according to the present
context.69
As noted, a substantial minority of the Committee on the Judicial
System dissented from the CJS Concept Paper on a variety of issues. One
of those dissents, which objects to the power of the Special Legislative
Committee, strongly invokes the concept of judicial independence:
[I]f judges are recommended by the legislature or any
committee at the legislature, and approval or ratification of
the appointment by the legislature on the recommendation,
the judiciary becomes likely a body under the legislature.
In a democratic system under the principle of separation of
power, the power of the states is divided in which the
legislature makes laws, the executive implements the laws
and the judiciary interprets the laws. Provided that, if the
legislature holds the sole power of the State to form an
organ of the state or holds power to supervise, control and
monitor the state organs, the judiciary can not be imagined
as an independent and competent. Consequently, the
country heads toward dictatorship and anarchism. While
writing a written Constitution, if the legislative [sic] is
made more powerful than the Constitution itself, there is
highly a chance of centralizing the power at the legislature,
which we never have wished.70
6 8. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 77.
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The ideological divide becomes apparent in this debate, even though both
sides are invoking principles of democracy, independence, and
accountability. Notwithstanding the predictions of doom in the dissenting
opinion, the Maoists do appear to believe in some degree of parliamentary
supremacy. Maoists argue that the check on the legislature's power or
abuse thereof rests with the people who can always vote out a legislature
that abuses the public trust. Maoists believe that one cannot trust an
unaccountable judiciary to play such a responsible role.n
The Nepal Bar Association (NBA) has also staked out a strong
position against the CJS Concept Paper by publishing its own position
paper on judiciary issues. It decries the CJS Concept Paper's approach for
its failure to "uphold the principle of independence of judiciary and the
separation of powers which is one of the fundamental pillars of
democracy."7 2  The NBA position paper goes on to "emphasize[] that
legislative interference (federal or provincial) with judicial appointments
and dismissals is not acceptable."
The President of the NBA has expressed his confidence-based on
conversations he has had with the highest level Maoist leaders-that even
the Maoists share the NBA's commitment to an independent judiciary. 74
However, the concrete proposals coming from the Maoists suggest that
judicial independence to the Maoists means something very different from
what it means to the NBA.
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Both the dissenting opinion and the NBA position paper make
specific reference to the concept of separation of powers, the latter
identifying it as "one of the fundamental pillars of democracy." 75 While the
Maoists speak of independence and accountability, they do not speak of
separation of powers, much less tout it as a pillar of democracy. The CJS
Concept Paper illustrates that the Maoist concept of democracy militates
against separation of powers and favors bringing the judiciary under the
control of the legislature as a means of "democratiz[ing]" the judiciary."
71. Interview with Ek Raj Bhandari, supra note 48.
72. NEPAL BAR Ass'N, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM UNDER NEPAL'S NEW CONSTITUTION 11
(2010).
73. Id.
74. Interview with Mr. Prem Bahadur Khadka, NBA President, in Kathmandu, Nepal
(July 13, 2010) (notes on file with author).
75. CJS CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 30, at 77; NEPAL BAR Ass'N, supra note 72, at 11.
76. CJS CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 30, at 39 ("As the legislature is a representative
body and also exercises the sovereignty of the people, the voice of people should only be
reflected via this body. . . . [I]t is necessary to democratize the judiciary according to the
present context.").
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The concept of separation of powers, raised first in the discussion of
judicial appointments, arises again in the context of constitutional
interpretation. The question of who should have the power of constitutional
interpretation in Nepal is sufficiently controversial and important to deserve
mention here. In the United States, constitutional interpretation is entrusted
to the Supreme Court. Americans are untroubled by the fact that by making
interpretive judgments the Court may actually be making law.77 In common
law jurisdictions, the concept of judge-made law is neither novel nor
threatening.78 This concept follows the traditional role of the common law
judiciary articulated above: to protect the public from the government.
Indeed, the power of the judiciary was invoked historically in common law
England as a check on the power of the king. 9
The tradition of the civil law is profoundly different. Judges were
expected to apply the law but not interpret it.80  From this perspective,
ambiguities in the law are to be referred to legislative bodies, not
judiciaries, for clarification.8  The rationale is that such interpretation and
clarification is inherently a legislative act.82 This ideology was established
under Roman legal tradition and revitalized by the French revolutionaries.
French revolutionaries did not see the judiciary as a champion of the rights
of the people, as in England, but rather as a barrier and a threat to
democratic governance.
Under civil law tradition, it is inappropriate to entrust issues of
interpretation, especially of the constitution, to the regular courts. Civil law
jurisdictions have developed separate institutions for such interpretation.84
In many of these countries, constitutional courts operate independently
from a supreme court and address issues of constitutional interpretation,
leaving a supreme court to function simply as the ultimate court of
appeals-the court of last resort.85 Conceptually, these constitutional courts
77. MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 40, at 17 ("The fear of judicial
lawmaking [in the United States and England] . .. did not exist. On the contrary, the power




80. Id. at 30 ("[Tjhe function of the judge would be limited to selecting the applicable
provision of the code and giving it its obvious significance in the context of the case .... ")
Id. at 39 ("[Prussian] judges were forbidden to interpret the code.").
81. Id at 40 ("A new governmental organ was created by the legislature and given the
power to quash incorrect interpretations by the courts .. .. [The Tribunal of Cassation] was
not a part of the judicial system, but rather a special instrument created by the legislature to
protect legislative supremacy from judicial usurpation.").
82. Id. at 30 ("Experience with the pre-revolutionary courts had made the French wary
ofjudicial law-making disguised as interpretation of laws.").
83. Id. at 35-36.
84. Id. at 37-38.
85. Id. at 37-38; see also, e.g., Differences Between the Constitutional Court and the
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were not to be courts at all and were not considered to be part of the judicial
branch, although over time they have assumed an increasingly judicial
character. Thus, although judicial review of legislative action has been a
sacred element of common law jurisprudence since Marbury v. Madison,87
judicial review, like any act of judicial interpretation, would be considered a
violation of separation of powers under the civil law tradition.
The CJS Concept Paper and the Maoists' draft both provide that
issues of constitutional interpretation will be entrusted to the Special
Legislative Committee, which is a legislative body.88 The NBA disagrees,
invoking the principle of separation of powers:
The NBA holds the position that the judiciary, and,
ultimately, the Supreme Court, should be the final body to
interpret the law, including the constitution, as per the
principle of the separation of powers and independence of
the judiciary. Accordingly, the NBA expresses grave
concern with the provision of the JS Concept Paper with
respect to the interpretation of constitution by a committee
of the federal legislature.89
The NBA view, therefore, reflects the perspective and ideology of a
common law jurisdiction. Such a perspective may not be surprising given
the profound influence of India in the region and the assistance and support
the NBA has received from Canadian sources.90
Supreme Court ofJustice, NISGUA, available at http://www.nisgua.org/themes campaigns/
impunity/Differences%20Between%20Constitutional%2Court%20and%20Supreme%20
Court%20of/o20Justice.pdf (describing the different jurisdiction of these two bodies in
Guatemala).
86. MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 40, at 37-38.
[T]hese special [constitutional] courts, which are not apart
of the ordinary judicial system and are not operated by
members of the ordinary judiciary, were established in
response to the civil law tradition that judges . .. cannot be
given such power to review statutes for constitutionality.
In time, many of these institutions have acquired judicial
character, particularly in jurisdictions that follow the
Germanic civil law tradition, and in Latin American civil
law tradition.
Id. at 134-42.
87. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
88. CJS Concept Paper, supra note 30, at 39; CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF NEPAL, (2067/2008) (Proposed Integrated Draft) § 172, at 69, available at
http://southasiarev.files.wordpress.com/20 11/0 1/new draft nepal consitution.pdf.
89. NEPAL BAR Ass'N, supra note 72, at 13.
90. See NEPAL BAR ASSOCIATION: DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY IN NEPAL (DDN-II),
http://nba-cba.org.np/new/index.php?option=CMS&task=detail&cid=5, (detailing the
cooperation and support of the Canadian Bar Association with and for the Nepal Bar
Association).
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A lawyer from a civil law jurisdiction would likely conclude,
however, that entrusting constitutional interpretation to the supreme court
would be the more serious violation of separation of powers. It is the
legislature, after all, that decides what the law is; the courts, with judges
operating as mere functionaries, are empowered only to apply the law-
ideally mechanically, to the extent that is possible-to individual cases.
There is nothing sacred about entrusting constitutional interpretation
issues to the Supreme Court of Nepal. While the principle of constitutional
supremacy is a vital one, fundamentally in conflict with the legislative
supremacy favored by the Maoists' and CJS Concept Paper's proposals,
there is nothing offensive to the core principles of judicial independence in
the creation of a separate constitutional court.91 Further, there may be great
advantages to such a court, particularly in its potential to attract consensus
both from separation of powers advocates and those who find the status quo
unacceptable.
VI. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? RECONCILING IT ALL
Ultimately, any compromises that are reached for the new Nepali
judiciary must reflect the ideological and historical forces at play in Nepal.
The largely independent judiciary of the past two decades utterly failed to
win public confidence and trust .92 The new judiciary for Nepal must be
more accountable and, thus, necessarily less independent than in the past.
The status quo is entirely unacceptable; serious changes have to be made,
which will come largely with greater accountability measures. Even the
NBA position paper-the fiercest defense of judicial independence seen in
the debate-speaks strongly about the importance of accountability:
In the survey conducted by the NBA the overwhelming
majority of respondents opined that judiciary should be
established as a corruption-free sector, and the code of
conduct should be implemented strongly against judges. It
is obvious that so as to maintain accountability of the
91. Most models for constitutional courts in other countries place the court reasonably
beyond the control of any one branch of government. The Indonesian Constitutional court,
for example, is composed of nine justices put forward by the three branches of government:
three by the President, three by the Supreme Court, and three by the legislature (the People's
Representative Council). Mohammad Mahfud, Separation of Powers and Independence of
Constitutional Court in Indonesia, at 9, (paper presented by the Chairman of the Indonesian
Constitutional Court at the 2nd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on Jan., 16-18, 2011), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/
WCCJ/Rio/Papers/INAMahfudE.pdf.
92. See Nepal's Judiciary Is Most Corrupt: TI report, supra note 60.
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judiciary, the effective implementation of codes of conduct
and impeachment proceedings must be strictly enforced.
However, the judiciary must also not be held accountable to
majoritarian forces. Even if the Maoists prefer to trust the people and see
themselves as the champions of the oppressed, Nepal has a long and ugly
history of discrimination against unpopular and disenfranchised
minorities.94 The majority can be expected to protect the rights of the
majority through legislative action, but someone must guarantee the rights
of Nepal's minorities, including women, Dalits, religious minorities, and a
host of ethnic subgroups.
The international consensus on best practice for enforcing judicial
accountability is to entrust enforcement of ethics codes, and the policing of
judicial misconduct and corruption to an independent judicial council.9s
However, the failure of the previous judicial council to perform this
function96 and the political imperative to avoid anything that appears to
perpetuate the status quo,97 militate in favor of creating a new institution to
assume this role. The ideological and historical forces at play in Nepal
require no less.
Notwithstanding the Maoists' best intentions, however, this new
institution should not be a body of the legislature. A better approach would
be for the new constitution to create a Judicial Complaints Commission
(JCC) within the judicial branch, empowered to investigate charges of
judicial misconduct and recommend disciplinary action, including removal
of judges found to violate ethical standards. This JCC may be appointed
with participation by political actors, but once appointed it should remain
one step removed from majoritarian political forces. Otherwise, the JCC
could be pressured to harass judges who render unpopular decisions that
93. NEPAL BAR Ass'N, supra note 72, at 14.
94. See, e.g., Press Release, Asian Human Rights Comm'n, NEPAL: Implementation of
Anti-Discrimination Laws (July 24, 2010), available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/
stories/WOO07/S00470/nepal-implementation-of-anti-discrimination-laws.htm (giving an
assessment of the failure to protect human rights of Dalits in Nepal).
95. The author made precisely this recommendation in an earlier article about the Nepali
judiciary. Constitutional Concepts, supra note 6, at 294-310. This article reconsiders and
amends that position.
96. Interview with Khim Lal Devkota, supra note 48; see supra text accompanying note
59.
97. See supra text accompanying note 20.
98. There are various ways to insulate JCC members from political interference. One
option might be to select JCC members from the ranks of the judiciary, have them serve one
term on the JCC, and then return to a secure post in the judiciary. Under this option they
need not worry about pleasing the appointing authorities since they cannot be renewed
anyway. Further, JCC members need not worry about using their influence to ingratiate
themselves to future employers since they have a secure post in the judiciary to which to
return in any case.
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protect the rights of minorities or judges whose politics or interests are at
odds with the ruling party.
Constitutional interpretation should also be at least one step removed
from the legislature, lest constitutional standards become subject to the
whims of the majority. Again, the judiciary's inability to muster public
confidence in the past weighs in favor of a new institution, such as a
constitutional court, to perform this role. This new institution, without a
history of corruption or politicization, may be the best hope for sound
constitutional administration in a new Nepal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Nepal must come together and find common ground and consensus
for the structure and character of its new government, which will be
reflected in the drafting of the new constitution. The debate over the
structure and role of the judiciary is divisive, is exacerbated by all sides
using similar rhetoric to argue for very different, even inconsistent
approaches.
Reconciliation of this war of words and ideas requires an appreciation
of the historical and ideological origins of the conflict. Moreover, Nepal
cannot merely adopt or import foreign models; it needs its own institutions
tailored to the nation's priorities in light of its culture, history, and
ideological orientations. For Nepal, this means a judicial structure that
strikes a balance between accountability and independence, decidedly
favoring the former. Most likely, it means creating new institutions like
(1) a Judicial Complaints Commission to enforce accountability, rather than
continuing to rely on a historically ineffective judicial council to do so, and
(2) a new, freshly empowered constitutional court to interpret and apply
constitutional protections and limitations, rather than continuing to rely on
its supreme court to perform this function. Only by replacing the tried-and-
failed, or at least tried-and-flawed, institutions against which the Maoists
have rebelled for so many years can Nepal hope to forge some semblance of
a consensus on the terms of its new constitution and chart a new future for
the people of Nepal.
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